

## Message Text

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 STATE 280085

73

ORIGIN EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /013 R

66011

DRAFTED BY: EUR/RPM:EDNEWSON

APPROVED BY: EUR/RPM:WTSHINN

----- 095718

P 132049Z NOV 76

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS PRIORITY

USNMR SHAPE

CINCLANT

CINCUSAREUR

CINCUSNAVEUR

USLOSACLANT

USCINCEUR

CINCUSAFE

XMT USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY PARIS

UNCLAS STATE 280085

THE FOLLOWING REPEAT USNATO 6217 SENT ACTION SECSTATE INFO  
SECDEF 13 NOV 76

QUOTE UNCLAS USNATO 6217

FOL TEL (MADRID 8625 DTG 121801Z NOV 76) SENT ACTION USNATO,  
BONN, PARIS, AND INFO USIA WASHDC, BEING REPEATED FOR  
YOUR INFO, QUOTE:

UNCLAS MADRID 8625

USIAC

USIA FOR IEE

E.O. 11652: N/A

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 STATE 280085

SUBJECT: PRESS RELEASE BY SENATORS BARTLETT AND NUNN

1. SENATORS DEWEY BARTLETT, OKLAHOMA, REPUBLICAN, AND SAM NUNN, GEORGIA, DEMOCRAT, REQUEST PRESS RELEASE OF FOLLOWING ON MONDAY, NOVEMBER 15, SIX A.M.:

2. TITLE: "NATO'S CONVENTIONAL DEFICIENCIES INVITE SOVIET ATTACK."

3. "SHOULD THE NATO ALLIANCE FAIL TO IMPROVE ITS CONVENTIONAL WAR-FIGHTING CAPABILITIES, THE SOVIETS WILL BE INCREASINGLY TEMPTED TO EXPLOIT POLITICALLY, OR EVEN MILITARILY, THEIR GROWING NON-NUCLEAR (CONVENTIONAL) POWER IN EASTERN EUROPE. IF CURRENT TRENDS CONTINUE, THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS WARSAW PACT ALLIES SOON MAY BE INVITED BY NATO WEAKNESSES TO LAUNCH A MAJOR CONVENTIONAL INVASION OF WESTERN EUROPE WHICH COULD ALTER THE WORLD BALANCE OF POWER IN A MATTER OF HOURS BEFORE ANY NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE FIRED. A WEAK CONVENTIONAL DETERRENT ERODES THE CREDIBILITY OF THE TACTICAL NUCLEAR AND STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DETERRENTS.

4. "SOVIET CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE HAVE UNDERGONE SIGNIFICANT EXPANSION DURING THE PAST DECADE AND ARE NOW BEING QUALITATIVELY IMPROVED. AGAINST A BACKGROUND OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR PARITY WITH THE UNITED STATES AND SUBSTANTIAL ADVANCES IN THEIR TACTICAL NUCLEAR CAPABILITY, THE SOVIETS HAVE PROVIDED THEIR NON-NUCLEAR FORCES DEPLOYED OPPOSITE WEST GERMANY AN ABILITY TO INITIATE A POTENTIALLY DEVASTATING INVASION OF EUROPE WITH AS LITTLE AS A FEW DAYS' WARNING. THIS IS EVIDENT IN A GROWING EMPHASIS UPON READINESS, MOBILITY, AND FIREPOWER OF THE SOVIET ARMY; IN RECENT MILITARY EXERCISES; IN THE DRAMATIC TRANSFORMATION OF SOVIET TACTICAL AVIATION FROM A DEFENSIVE FORCE INTO A HARD-HITTING OFFENSIVE AIR ARMADA OF EXPANDED REACH; AND IN THE CONCENTRATION OF THE SOVIET NAVY ON DEVELOPING A CAPABILITY TO NEUTRALIZE THE U.S. 6TH FLEET -- PARTICULARLY AIRCRAFT CARRIERS -- IN THE FIRST DAYS OF A CONFLICT.

5. "THE VIABILITY OF NATO'S CURRENT STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03     STATE 280085

RESPONSE IN THE USE OF CONVENTIONAL NON-NUCLEAR, TACTICAL NUCLEAR, AND STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES IS NOW OPEN TO SERIOUS QUESTION. WHILE SOVIET FORCES IN EASTERN EUROPE CAN INITIATE A CONFLICT FROM A STANDING START, NATO FORCES CONTINUE TO RELY UPON WARNING TIME OF A DURATION SUFFICIENT TO PERMIT THE ALLIANCE TO MOBILIZE AND DEPLOY TO THE CENTER OF CONFLICT ITS ULTIMATELY GREATER BUT TYPICALLY LESS READY AND POORLY

DEPLOYED FORCES. AS THE WARSAW PACT CAPABILITY TO ATTACK FROM A STANDING START GROWS RELATIVE TO NATO'S DEFENSIVE CAPACITY, SO DOES THE LIKELIHOOD THAT THE WARSAW PACT WOULD ALREADY BE ON THE RHINE WHEN THE NATO DECISION IS MADE TO USE TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

6. "SHOULD THERE BE ANOTHER CONFLICT IN EUROPE, MILITARILY IT WILL PROBABLY BE A 'COME-S-YOU-ARE' PARTY AND THE SIDE WHICH ARRIVES 'LAST WITH LEAST' WILL BE CONDEMNED TO FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR CONVENTIONAL DEFEAT.

7. "THE DANGER IS NOT THAT IMPROVED NATO CONVENTIONAL FORCES WOULD DECOUPLE THE DEFENSE OF WESTERN EUROPE FROM AMERICA'S STRATEGIC AND THEATER NUCLEAR DETERRENT. ON THE CONTRARY, THE REAL DANGER IS THAT S FURTHER SHIFT OF THE CONVENTIONAL BALANCE IS FAVOR OF THE WARSAW PACT COULD IMPAIR THE INTEGRITY AND VIABILITY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE BY COMPELLING THE NATO ALLIES TO CHOOSE BETWEEN USING TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON THEIR OWN TERRITORY OR ACCEPTING DEFEAT AT THE HANDS OF IMPROVED SOVIET CONVENTIONAL FORCES.

8. "THE ISSUE IS NOT EXCLUSIVELY A MILITARY ONE. THE NATO ALLIES WOULD BE MOST VULNERABLE TO AN INTENSE CONVENTIONAL ATTACK WITH SHORT WARNING AT A TIME OF POLITICAL WEAKNESS OR TRANSITION WHEN THE DECISION TO MOBILIZE OR TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS MIGHT BE DELAYED. TO MEET THE NEW THREAT CONFRONTING THE ALLIANCE REQUIRES CHANGES NOT ONLY IN MILITARY POSTURE BUT ALSO IN POLITICAL ATTITUDES. THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND THE GENERAL PUBLIC MUST UNDERSTAND THE IMPLICATIJS OF THE NEW SOVIET CONVENTIONAL THREAT. IT APPEARS UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 STATE 280085

THAT PUBLIC OPINION IN SOME NATO COUNTIRES IS AHEAD OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN THIS REGARD. OUR NATO ALLIES AND THE UNITED STATES MUST DEVOTE ENOUGH RESOURCES TO PROVIDE A CREDIBLE CONVENTIONAL DAMRRRENT TO THE THREAT OF ATTACK WITH LITTLE WARNING. ADDITIONALLY, TOP PRIORITY ATTENTION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO DEVELOPING WAYS TO SPEED UP THE POLITICAL DECISIONS REQUIRED TO MEET UNEXPECTED WARSAW PACT MOBILIZATION. A CONFERENCE OF KEY NATO MILITARY AND POLITICAL LEADERS SHOULD BE CONVENED TO IDENTIFY THE STEPS NEEDED TO MEET THIS CHALLENGE.

9. "MILITARY, NATO MUST UNDERTAKE A FUNDAMENTAL ENHANCEMENT OF ITS CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES. THE PRINCIPLE UNDERLYING THIS NEED FOR ENHANCEMENT IS THAT MODERN WARFARE IS CHARACTERIZED BY FIREPOWER NOT MANPOWER.

10. "FIRST AND FOREMOST IS THAT A QUANTUM JUMP IS NEEDED IN NATO'S CONVENTIONAL FIREPOWER BY FULLY EXPLOITING RECENT TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES IN MUNITIONS AND BY EXPANDING SUBSTANTIALLY STOCKS OF ARTILLERY AND OTHER GROUND FORCE MUNITIONS IN ADDITION TO AIR-TO-AIR MISSILES.

11. "SECOND, TOP PRIORITY SHOULD BE ASSIGNED TO ACHIEVING THE NECESSARY IMPROVEMENTS IN COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS, AND MOBILITY WHICH WILL BE REQUIRED IF NATO IS TO BRING THIS FIREPOWER TO BEAR IN TIME AND IN PLACES OF ITS CHOOSING.

12. THIRD, SERIOUS DEFICIENCIES IN NATO'S EXISTING AIR DEFENSES MUST BE REMEDIED IF IT IS TO DEFEAT THE NEW THREAT POSED BY SOVIET TACTICAL AVIATION.

13. "FOURTH, THE READINESS OF U.S. AND ALLIED CONTINGENTS THROUGHOUT THE CRUCIAL CENTRAL REGION MUST BE INCREASED THROUGH RELOCATION OF AMMUNITION AND AN EASTWARD REPOSITIONING OF MAJOR COMBAT UNITS.

14. "FIFTH, THE PACE AT WHICH UNITED STATES, BRITISH, AND OTHER ALLIED REINFORCEMENTS CAN BE TRANSFERRED TO THE BATTER AREA MUST BE ENHANCED THROUGH GREATER STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL AIRLIFT CAPABILITY AND THE PREPOSITIONING  
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 05     STATE 280085

OF ADDITIONAL STOCKS OF ARMS AND EQUIPMENT ON THE CONTINENT.

16. "FINALLY, INTEROPERABILITY AND STANDARDIZATION OF ARMS AND EQUIPMENT MUST BE RELENTLESSLY PURSUED. THE MILITARY--TO SAY NOTHING OF THE ECONOMIC--PRICE OF CONTINUING RELIANCE ON A PLETHORA OF NATIONAL ARMAMENTS INVENTORIES AND TACTICAL DOCTRINES OFTEN INCOMPATIBLE WITH ONE ANOTHER SERVES THE INTERESTS ONLY OF THE WARSAW PACT. STANDARDIZATION CAN ALSO BE EXPANDED BY REALISTIC JOINT NATO EXERCISES.

17. "PROMISING FIRST STEPS HAVE BEEN TAKEN IN MOST OF THESE AREAS. HOWEVER, MUCH MORE NEEDS TO BE DONE. MOREOVER, WHAT MUST BE DONE MUST BE DONE BY THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE. IF THE NATO ALLIANCE IS TO ACHIEVE A GENUINE CAPACITY TO DETER A SUDDEN WARSAW PACT CONVENTIONAL ATTACK, ITS EUROPEAN MEMBERS MUST BE PREPARED TO DO MUCH MORE THAN THEY ARE NOW DOING. THE DEFENSE OF WESTERN EUROPE IS VITAL TO THE UNITED STATES. BUT IT SHOULD BE EVEN MORE VITAL TO THE EUROPEAN ALLIES.

18. "THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT U.S. FORCES IN EUROPE CAN ESCAPE THE NEED FOR IMPROVEMENT. WE MUST ALSO DO OUR PART. OUR FORCES, TOO, ARE SHORT ON FIREPOWER, AIR DEFENSE, READINESS, AND THE COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITIES DEMANDED BY MODERN COMBAT. IT IS THE ABILITY TO QUICKLY BRING TO BEAR HEAVY FIRE-POWER, RATHER THAN SIMPLY MASSES OF MEN, WHICH WILL DETERMINE THE OUTCOME OF A FUTURE CONFLICT. WE, TOO, MUST APPLY THE NECESSARY RESOURCES TO THESE PRIORITY ITEMS. WE MUST MAKE SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS IN REPOSTURING BY A FUNDAMENTAL REASSESSMENT OF OUR STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL AIRLIFT REQUIREMENTS. WE MUST REVIEW OUR FOREIGN MILITARY SALES POLICIES, PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF SHORTAGES OF EQUIPMENT AND AMMUNITION IN OUR OWN FORCES.

19. "THE TASKS BEFORE NATO, WHICH HAS SERVED THE INTERESTS OF THE WEST SO WELL FOR SO LONG, ARE  
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 06     STATE 280085

UNQUESTIONABLY WITHIN THE ECONOMIC RESOURCES OF THE ALLIANCE. NATO ENCOMPASSES THE GREATEST ECONOMIC AND INDUSTRIAL CONSTELLATION ON THE PLANET. NATO DOES NOT LACK THE MEANS; NATO MUST DEMONSTRATE THAT IT DOES NOT LACK THE WILL."

SIGNED RYLANCE

UNQUOTE. STRAUSS-KHOF

UNQUOTE KISSINGER

UNCLASSIFIED

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** ALLIANCE, CODELS, PRESS RELEASES, MILITARY CAPABILITIES, CONVENTIONAL WARFARE  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 13 NOV 1976  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** n/a  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** n/a  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:**  
**Disposition Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1976STATE280085  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** EUR/RPM:EDNEWSON  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** N/A  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Film Number:** D760425-0230  
**From:** STATE  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1976/newtext/t19761150/aaaabrbe.tel  
**Line Count:** 257  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Office:** ORIGIN EUR  
**Original Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 5  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** morefirh  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 25 NOV 2003  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <25 NOV 2003 by GarlanWA>; APPROVED <06 JAN 2004 by morefirh>  
**Review Markings:**

Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
04 MAY 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** PRESS RELEASE BY SENATORS BARTLETT AND NUNN  
**TAGS:** MCAP, MORG, OREP, US, XG, NATO, (NUNN, SAM), (BARTLETT, DEWEY)  
**To:** NATO POSTS MULTIPLE  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006